Restricted and Denied Parties

restricted stamp The term 鈥渞别蝉迟谤颈肠迟别诲鈥� or even 鈥渄enied parties鈥� is used to broadly indicate entities and individuals that have been determined by the U.S. government to present a significant risk to national security. Collaborating, and in some cases even interacting with restricted or denied parties on export-controlled or other sensitive activities will require greater levels of prior approval and mitigation. In a growing number of areas, the university will be precluded from almost any type of engagement.

How do you know if a person or entity is restricted?
Foreign universities and research institutes are a growing risk

The U.S. government maintains and updates a group of lists that identify individuals and organizations that have engaged in, or are believed to support, certain activities of concern (see, e.g.,听,听,听听补苍诲听). As a general rule, university employees should not engage with any person or organization on these lists without first seeking authorization from the Office of Export Controls (OEC). This would including research collaborations, material transfer agreements, external sales or shipping, foreign teaching and speaking arrangements听and other transactions. OEC will assist in your efforts to analyze foreign organizations, and will provide compliance advice as appropriate, including seeking a federal license.

Compliance requires dilligence: As these lists are published and available to the foreign entities identified, the most nefarious and strategic have developed a practice of using associated business aliases to evade detection and prohibition. Although the U.S. government amends these lists to adapt to the emergence of new names, sub-units, etc., it does so with a delay. If you encounter circumstances that lead you to believe you are working with a person or organization that is acting on behalf of a foreign entity, you have a duty to inquire and conduct dilligence as to who that foreign entity might be.

Historically, restricted and denied party lists focused mainly on individuals, corporations and government organizations, leaving academia and research institutes largely untouched. Yet, as the military posture and sophistication of certain countries has changed in recent years, so too has the identification of foreign universities and research centers as restricted or denied parties grown. Although the large majority of foreign universities are perfectly fine for collaboration, CU 麻豆影院 faculty and research staff should contact the Office of Export Controls before entering into an agreement, contract, or other arrangement with any foreign university or institute.听

Additionally, public univerisities in certain high risk countries do not operate in a similar manner as universities do in the United States. The difference includes how they get funding, how much control their government has over their research, and their ability to exercise "academic freedom." Due to the strenghtening nexus between emerging technologies and military end uses, there is a growing risk that the research of greatest interest to the international science community, has a growing connection to a use or user that would be otherwise anathema to U.S. interests, both academic and commercial.

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