Student Name:聽Ben Deitsch
Course: PSCI 3022
Instructor: Prof. Sarah Sokhey
Published: March 15, 2019
Belarusian President Alexandr Lukashenko鈥檚 February announcement that Belarus was 鈥渞eady to unite鈥 their state with Russia didn鈥檛 raise much of a response from the West, perhaps suspecting that the statement was not particularly serious.1 However, Lukashenko鈥檚 question of "Are you 鈥 Russians and Belarusians 鈥 ready for it?鈥 is an interesting one.1 What would be the outcome of such a union, and would that outcome be desirable in the first place? The purpose of this paper is to consider the outcomes of a Russian-Belarusian Union and ultimately suggest that such a union would be against the interests of the Russian state.
The economic and political state of Belarus is dire, and is reflected in Belarus鈥 interests in a true unification treaty. Belarus鈥 economy is approximately one-thirtieth the size of Russia鈥檚, with GDP per capita at approximately one half of the Russian level. 2, 3 Belarus currently is in many ways subsidized by the Russian state, with some estimates suggesting that up to 20% of Belarusian revenues are the direct result of Russian subsidies.4 Belarus is also extremely dependent on Russia in terms of international trade, with Russia making up 44% of exports and 56% of imports.5 The Belarusian economy is largely in the public sector, with only 15% of economic activity in the private sector, meaning that salaries, infrastructure, and other business expenditures are often footed by the government.6 All of this comes at a time when Belarus鈥 debt would likely have to be paid by Russia to avoid default.7 It is additionally important to note the Russia has very little economic interest in the region, with Andrey Suzdaltsev, a researcher at the Moscow Higher School of Economics stating that Russia鈥檚 only real economic interests in the region are a few modernized refineries and a single fertilizer company, otherwise the economic relationship is completely 鈥渁symmetric鈥.4 Additionally, many of Russia鈥檚 economic problems (and hurdles for the Putin regime) such as public research, poverty reduction, public education, demographic transition (i.e. pensions), and infrastructure investment are ones best solved by government expenditure. 8,9 Put succinctly, 鈥渕any Russian regions can justly demand subsidies before Belarus.鈥 10
It is therefore my suggestion that the Russian government not pursue a full political union with Belarus. The Russian government need not take on additional expenditures at a time when the Russian state should be funneling money into domestic initiatives. The Belarusian State, with its variety of economic policies, is a liability that the Russian government need not accept. Pursuing supranational policies is instead the superior alternative and more flexible for both states. Strengthening economic ties through a continued customs union and international loans/ subsidies has many of the benefits of a political union without the necessary burden of completely supporting the Belarusian state. Through the Eurasian Customs Union, the two states are currently free to strengthen economic ties, facilitating Russian exports to the region and providing a framework to strengthen both nations鈥 economy.11 The Russian state would also befree to supply the state with subsidies on its terms, subsidies that allow the Russian government to influence the political direction of Belarus.12 Continuing to pursue the status quo is the best possible option for the Russian state that provides both the benefits of the Belarusian partnership, without incurring the significant political and economic costs of integrating a poorer region into an already poor country.
It could be objected that a Russian-Belarusian integration treaty could be a military advantage for the Russian state, if nothing else. However, this is shortsighted for a variety of reasons. The first being that the Russian state already has a military presence in Belarus. As early as 2002, a paper for NATO stated unequivocally in the first sentence: 鈥淏elarus has been transformed into a Russian military outpost.鈥 13 This continues to this day, with Russia conducting the 2017 Zapad War Games in Belarus (with some claiming this was an elaborate way for Russia to station troops in Belarus).14, 15 Clearly, under the status quo, Russia has extensive military access to the Belarusian state, and taking on the economic costs would seem to accomplish nothing except perhaps further provoking NATO.16 There is also the claim that a formal integration treaty could serve to stabilize the famously shaky relationship between the two states, however, this is a misreading of the situation. Belarus鈥 ties to Russia are so strong that any reorientation to the EU or NATO would be illogical. Lukashenko鈥檚 recent flirtations with the West don鈥檛 represent a massive shift, rather they are merely a bit of 鈥渢ruancy鈥 from an otherwise subservient ally.17, 18
For economic and military reasons, the Russian government should not seriously consider a full political union with Belarus. The benefits of such a union could be obtained in the status quo, or through measures that do not amount to the full integration of the Belarusian state, and the potential economic and geopolitical ramifications of such a treaty do not offset the costs in a relationship that would provide little (if not a net negative) for the Russian state. Ultimately, it is likely the recent incarnation of unification talks on the part of Lukashenko is merely another round of political havering, which is probably better for all parties involved.
Works Cited:
1 The Moscow Times Editorial Staff. 鈥淏elarus Ready to 'Unite' With Russia, Lukashenko Says.鈥
The Moscow Times, The Moscow Times, 15 Feb. 2019,
were-ready-unite-with-russia-belarus-leader-lukashenko-says-a64517.
2 鈥淩ussia: Overview.鈥 World Bank, The World Bank Group, 11 Oct. 2018,
en/country/russia/overview.
3 鈥淏elarus: Overview.鈥 World Bank, The World Bank Group, 2018,
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4 Biernat, Jakub. 鈥淩ussia No Longer Wants to Subsidize Belarus.鈥 Central European Financial
Observer, Narodowy Bank Polski, 27 Nov. 2018, financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/russia-nolonger-
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5 鈥淏elarus.鈥 Observatory of Economic Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018,
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6 Danilovich, Alex. Russian-Belarusian Integration: Playing Games Behind the Kremlin Walls.
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11 Carneiro, Francisco G. 鈥淲hat Promises Does the Eurasian Customs Union Hold for the
Future?鈥 World Bank Economic Premises, The World Bank Group, Feb. 2013,
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to Belarus.鈥 Macroeconomic Update: How Big Is the Russian Energy Subsidy to Belarus, IPM
Research Center, 26 Mar. 2018, eng.research.by/analytics/macroforecast/1802/.
13 Martinsen, Kaare Dahl. 鈥淭he Russian-Belarusian Union and the Near Abroad.鈥 Norwegian
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14 Radio Free Europe Editorial Staff. 鈥淯kraine's Military Chief Says Russia Left Troops In
Belarus After War Games.鈥 RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 29
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28764925.html.
15 Mehta, Aaron. 鈥淟essons from Zapad - Jamming, NATO and the Future of Belarus.鈥 Defense
News, Defense News, 27 Nov. 2017,
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16 Sokolsky, Richard. 鈥淭he New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European
Security.鈥 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 Mar. 2017, carnegieendowment.org/
2017/03/13/new-nato-russia-military-balance-implications-for-european-security-pub-68222.
17 Wilson, Andrew. 鈥淏elarus's Game of Truancy.鈥 ECFR, European Council on Foreign
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18 Pakhomov, Nikolay. 鈥淲hy Belarus Can't Afford to Be the New Ukraine.鈥 The National
Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 23 Feb. 2017, nationalinterest.org/feature/whybelarus-
cant-afford-be-the-new-ukraine-19535.