麻豆影院

Conservative Christians have cheered restrictions on some birth control. But many decades ago, Christian leaders鈥� support helped contraceptives become acceptable in the first place

Since May 3, 2022, when听听that the Supreme Court was planning to strike down Roe v. Wade, many Christians听听the prospect of an America where abortion is not a constitutionally protected right 鈥� or听听.

Meanwhile, other conservative Christians have been working on a related target:听.

In July 2020, when听听ruled that organizations with 鈥渟incerely held religious or moral objection鈥� are not obligated to provide contraceptive coverage to their employees, many conservative Christians听. Six years before, the evangelical owners of crafting chain Hobby Lobby took their objections to covering the IUD in their health insurance plans all the way to the Supreme Court. Hobby Lobby argued 鈥� incorrectly, according to most听听鈥� that it was听, and therefore they should not have to cover employees鈥� health insurance for it. The justices sided with the chain鈥檚 owners.

Yet as access to both abortion and contraception听, the vast majority of Protestants听听some form of contraception. Their actions are supported by almost 100 years of pastoral advocacy on the issue. In my work as听a scholar of religous studies, gender and sexuality, I have researched the Protestant leaders who campaigned to make contraception respectable, and therefore widely acceptable, in the mid-20th century.

History, I have found, provides a different story about the relationship between Protestants and birth control.

鈥楻esponsible parenthood鈥�

As new contraceptive options emerged in the first two-thirds of the 20th century, from the听听to the birth control pill, Christian leaders听. Many came to see birth control as a moral good that would allow married couples to have satisfying sex lives, while protecting women from the health risks of frequent pregnancies. They hoped it could ensure that couples would not have more children than they could care for, emotionally and economically.

They looked inward, considering the consequences of birth control for their own communities, and hoped that 鈥減lanned鈥� or 鈥渞esponsible鈥� sex would create healthy families and decrease divorce. They also looked outward, thinking about birth control鈥檚 wider implications, at a time of widespread concern that the global population听.

By the time听听came on the market in the 1960s, liberal and even some conservative Protestants were advocating for birth control听.鈥�

鈥淩esponsible parenthood鈥� reframed debates about family size around 鈥淐hristian duty.鈥� To be responsible in parenting was not only to avoid having more children than you could afford, nurture and educate. It also meant considering responsibilities outside the home toward churches, society and humanity.

Protestant leaders supporting contraception argued that the best kind of family was a father with a steady job and a homemaker mother, and that birth control could听, because smaller families could maintain a comfortable lifestyle on one income. They also hoped that contraception would help couples stay together by allowing them to have satisfying sex lives.

Multiple denominations听.听, for example, the Anglican Communion stated that family planning was a 鈥減rimary obligation of Christian marriage,鈥� and chastised parents 鈥渨ho carelessly and improvidently bring children into the world, trusting in an unknown future or a generous society to care for them.鈥�

The big picture

Religious leaders鈥� support for 鈥渞esponsible parenthood鈥� was not just about deliberately creating the kind of Christian families they approved of. It was also about heading off the horrors of听听鈥� a fear very much front of mind in mid-century America.

In the middle of the 20th century, with increased access to vaccines and antibiotics, more children were living to adulthood and life expectancies were rising. Protestant leaders feared this so-called听听would outstrip the Earth鈥檚 food supply, leading to famine and war.

In 1954, when the global population stood at听, Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick,听, framed overpopulation as one of the world鈥檚 鈥渂asic problems,鈥� and the birth control pill, which was then being developed, as the best potential solution.

Richard Fagley, a minister who served on the World Council of Church鈥檚 Commission of the Churches on International Affairs,听听in family planning, science had provided Christians with a new venue听. Medical knowledge, Fagley wrote, is 鈥渁 liberating gift from God, to be used to the glory of God, in accordance with his will for men.鈥�

These 鈥渞esponsible parenthood鈥� ideas held that religious couples had a responsibility to be good stewards of the earth by not having more children than the planet could support. In the context of marriage, contraception was viewed as moral, shoring up a particular form of Christian values.

Yesterday鈥檚 arguments

These ideas about 鈥済ood鈥� and 鈥渂ad鈥� families often rested on assumptions about race and gender that reproductive rights advocates find troubling today.

Early in the 20th century, predominantly white, Protestant clergy were very interested in increasing access to contraception for the poor, who were often Catholic or Jewish immigrants听. Some scholars have argued that early support for contraception was predominantly about eugenics, particularly before World War II. Among some white leaders, there was concern about so-called听: the racist fear that 鈥渢hey鈥� would be overwhelmed.

Apart from听, most of these clergy wanted to give people access to contraception in order to create 鈥渉ealthy鈥� families, regardless of income level. Yet many were unable or unwilling to see how they were promoting a narrow view of the ideal family, and how that marginalized poor communities and people of color 鈥� themes I am studying in my current book project.

Moreover, many proponents were advocating for women鈥檚 health, but not reproductive freedom. Their priority was setting women up for听听of the middle-class, Christian motherhood. With fewer children, some hoped, families would be able to get by on just a husband鈥檚 salary, meaning more women at home raising children.

A battle won 鈥� and lost?

Over the decades, Protestant leaders have, in large part, disappeared from pro-birth control arguments.

There are many reasons. Mid-century agricultural technologies reduced fears of overpopulation 鈥� which have only recently been听. Meanwhile, mainline Protestant churches, and their public influence,听are shrinking. Conservative leaders eventually grew concerned that birth control would lead to more working women, not fewer. And since the 1970s, evangelicals听听to abortion, which was increasingly linked to birth control through the broad term 鈥渇amily planning.鈥�

In other words, since the 鈥減opulation bomb鈥� was no longer ticking, contraception no longer seemed like such an urgent necessity 鈥� and some of its other implications troubled conservatives, breaking an almost pan-Protestant alliance.

Meanwhile, liberal Protestants had so embraced contraception that they no longer viewed it as turf that needed defending. Today, 99% of American girls and women between the ages of 15 and 44 who have ever had sex听. Reproductive rights advocates turned their attention to abortion rights 鈥� largely leaving religious views on birth control to their opponents.

This article is republished from under a Creative Commons license. Read the .